Quantum Neurophysics
and the Measurement Problem
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 13:27:36 -0800
From: Gordon Globus <gglobus@orion.oac.uci.edu>
To: quantum-d@teleport.com
Subject: Quantum Neurophysics and the Measurement Problem
In discussions of the measurement problem in quantum physics,
the theory of perception is strangely left out, left for someone else to
deal with, as if it were not a profound problem inextricably tangled with
the measurement problem. This absence can be discerned in the opening
sentence of Umezawa's (1993) admirable "Advanced Field Theory." Umezawa
extends the quantum field description of *microwelt* objects, like
photons, to *mitwelt* objects of macroscopic scale, like stones, silicon
computers and brains. (The scale extension to macroscopic objects is
achieved by Bogoliubov transformation of the quantized field.) Yet
Umezawa opens 1.1 with the statement: "Most of the phenomena that we
observe in nature are of a macroscopic nature." In thus speaking of
observables, Umezawa adds an undefined theory of perception to his
quantum field description at the macroscopic scale.
I think this is a good point on the trajectory of discourse
about the measurement problem to focus in on the neglected problem of
perception, a good time because with the burgeoning work in quantum
neurophysics, a quantum theory of perception is in sight. I hope to
cast fresh light on the measurement problem in this communication, by
presenting a quantum theory of perception based in Yasue's "quantum
brain dynamics" (QBD) (Jibu and Yasue, 1995).
In QBD brain biosubstrates spontaneously generate various
second-order quantum fields that interact. Stones, silicon computers
and brains all come under first-order quantum field description, but
stones and computers don't themselves hoist second order quantum
fields (whatever the computer might simulate), whereas brains do. Each
of the participating second-order quantum fields subserves a different
function, are "representatives" of memory, cognition, and reality.
Perception of the world *results* from the quantum field interaction, or
better, the perceptible world *unfolds* from the quantum field
interaction (or even better, "thrownness in the world" continually
unfolds from the interaction). Paraphrasing Neisser in "Cognition and
Reality," perception is where quantum cognition, quantum memory and
quantum reality meet.
It should be appreciated here that "representatives" are
mathematically complex unobservables. They are Schroedinger-like
wave functions over quantum fields. (So I use "representatives" rather
than "re-presentations," since the wave function per se is unpresentable.
"Representatives" imply an influence; its connotation is more cybernetic
to my ear than passive "re-presentations.") Observables appear as
complex representatives find conjugate representatives. I think of
quantum memory and cognition as a store of superposed possibilities
from which actualities (observables) continually unfold in the
interaction with the quantum reality representative.
It is also important to appreciate the relationship between
second-order unfolded observables and first-order quantum reality.
Fundamental physical conservation laws insure that observables are
symmetry-conserving with respect to reality (Yasue, Jibu and Pribram,
1991). (Yasue extends Hamilton's principle of least action to a
principle of least neural action in which a neural Lagrangian is
minimized, which functionally means that the velocity and acceleration
of ionic currents in the perimembranous bioplasma are minimized.)
Observables can stand in for quantum reality because they conserve
invariances within the input flux.
Let me apply this theory of perception to the measurement
problem, and then illustrate with Schroedinger's cat. Both microscopic
and macroscopic reality come under first-order quantum field description.
But certain real macroscopic objects have the capability of hoisting
second-order quantum fields and supporting their interactions, and out
of those interactions observables are continually unfolded. Observables
are thus derivative (*maya*?). The first-order ontology is unbroken
(whereas with the Heisenberg actual events Stapp (1993) likes, the primary
ontology is punctuated by collapses, and so duality is fundamental).
*The wave function never collapses,* not even in measurement, and so
first-order ontology is not torn. That putative event of collapse is
replaced by the match between a complex representative and its conjugate
on a second-order level.
To illustrate with Schroedinger's cat: The essentials of the
puzzle are that a closed box is contrived to contain, according to
quantum physics, a superposition of a dead cat and a live one. It is
Schroedinger's conscious observation on opening the box that appears
to "collapse the wave function" and the observable cat is found, dead
or alive as the case may be. Thus Schroedinger's observation takes the
cat out of the quantum superposition; half the time his very act of
conscious observation wrenches poor kitty from quantum limbo to her
sadly observable death.
My "solution" is to understand the Schroedinger equation in the
illustration as quantum neurophysical; the equation is not describing the
evolution of Schroedinger's world but his brain. The wave function is
in some sense subjective, as Bohr and Heisenberg surmised early on. The
superposition of "cat dead" and "cat alive" is a superposition of
Schroedinger's cognitive expectations under the experimental conditions.
This cognition is carried by a phase wave over quantum fields (hoisted
by a nanolevel web of filamentous proteins, including the much-discussed
microtubules). As such, cognition is cybernetic, offering possibilities
to the complex match with invariants in the input flux, and thereby
controlling the unfolding of macroscopic objects.
When Schroedinger prepares to open the box, the cat under quantum
field description is already either dead or alive. (Don't think of "dead"
and "alive" as observables here.) Schroedinger's cognition as carried by
Schoedinger-like phase waves in his brain is a superposition of two
possibilities brought to the match with input that will take place on
opening the box. If the cat is in fact alive, then on opening the box a
match will be made with the alive possibility and a live cat will be
unfolded in Schroedinger's perception.
So the so-called collapse of the wave function is quantum
neurophysical--but "collapse" is misleading, what's happening here is
a match of a complex representative and its conjugate representative
in second-order quantum field interactions, and the unfolding of
observable order in the match. (In Bohm's [1980] terms, cognitive
expectations are "implicate orders" and observables are "explicate
orders.")
One big fly in this ointment is that brains turn out to be
windowless monads within which worlds are unfolded out of second-
order quantum field interactions. The world in common fragments into
parallel worlds (kept coherent to the extent that input, memory and
cognition are similar). Ah, the existential isolation, each of us
enclosed within a quantum monad (where it would take a sorcerer to
feel at home), ensnared in *maya*--which is admittedly all hard to
accept! But it should not be surprising that extending the quantum
revolution to quantum neurophysics would again powerfully solicit
common sense...
Bohm, D. (1980), Wholeness and the Implicate Order (Boston: Routledge and
Kegan Paul).
Jibu, M. and Yasue, K. (1995), Quantum Brain Dynamics and Consciousness
(Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins).
Neisser, U. (1976), Cognition and Reality (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman).
Stapp, H.(. (1993), Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Berlin, Heidelberg
and New York: Springer Verlag).
Umezawa, H. (1993), Advanced Field Theory: Micro, Macro, and Thermal
Physics (New York: American Institute of Physics).
Yasue K., Jibu M. and Pribram K.H. (1991), Appendix to K.H. Pribram, Brain
and
Perception (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.).
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